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The state of comparative law could not be more different between 
the United States and Europe. In Europe, Abo Junker observes: 
“Whoever today advocates turning one‘s view across borders—
“to substitute a global for a national horizon”—can be sure of 
broad approval. He is riding a mighty wave of the Zeitgeist.”1 But 
in the United States, Alain A. Levasseur despairs, “[O]utside the 
realm of some U.S. law schools, the relevance of comparative law 
is almost non-existent, which is really a euphemism for ‘nil’.”2 De-
spite lifetimes of labor by distinguished comparativists such as 
Max Rheinstein, Rudolf Schlesinger, John Hazard and others liv-
ing and deceased, the United States persists in legal isolationism.3 
In this contribution we discuss some explanations of this phe-
nomenon. 
 
I. The Problem Of Comparative Law in the U.S.A. Today 
 
1. The Present State of Comparative Law in the United States 
 
The United States pays comparative law no mind. Judges, as Alain 
A. Levasseur demonstrates, virtually never consider foreign legal 
                                                          
1 “Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagenfach,” 1994 Juristenzeitung 921. Transla-
tions are the author’s. 
2 “The Use of Comparative Law by Courts (II),” 42 Am. J. Comp. L. Supplement 41 
(1994). 
3 The conflicts scholar, Ernest G. Lozenzen of Yale, seems to have been one of the 
first writers to use the term “legal isolationism.” Book Review, 54 Yale L.J. 886 
(1945). (“Now that we have at long last abandoned our political isolationism, the 
legal profession must awake to the fact that our law has been bogged down by 
an attitude of legal isolationism. Our new position in the world makes it impera-
tive that we become better acquainted with other legal systems. We cannot prop-
erly maintain our leadership if we remain ignorant of the legal order under 
which other countries live.”) See also Hessel E. Yntema, “Comparative Legal 
Research, Some Remarks on ‘Looking Out of the Cave’,” 54 Mich. L. Rev. 899 
(1956). 
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materials.4 Legislators and administrators do not commission 
comparative studies of law such as are commonly conducted in 
connection with legislation in Europe.5 Even in the universities, 
comparative law is literally dying out; few legal academics engage 
in serious comparative law studies.6  
 Comparative law has less importance in the United States 
today than it did a generation ago, and, indeed, less than it did in 
much of the nineteenth century.7 While there has never been a 
golden age of comparative law in America, Basil Markesinis notes 
that central European émigré scholars did achieve “phenomenal 
success” in the 1950s, and 1960s when they made comparative law 
a “recognized, even admired, topic at a time when there was 
                                                          
4 Supra note 2. 
5 One recent example: all the proposals for “civil justice reform” of recent years 
essentially ignored foreign examples. See Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, 
“Civil Justice Reform in the United States—Opportunity for Learning from ‘Civi-
lized’ European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?”, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 
147, 154 (1994).  
6 If our assessment seems too dismal, the reader may consult: Alain A. Levas-
seur, supra note 2; P. John Kozyris, “Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: New Horizons and New Technologies,” 69 Tulane L. Rev. 165, 177 (1994) 
(influence described as “minimal” and “marginal”); John Langbein, “The Influ-
ence of Comparative Procedure in the U.S.”, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 545 (1995) (“The 
study of comparative procedure in the United States has little following in aca-
demia, and virtually no audience in the courts or in legal policy circles.” ); 
Mathias Reimann, “The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject,” 11 
Tulane Eur. & Civil L. Forum 49, 52 (1996) (“A Subject on the Margin … interest in 
the subject is very limited among both faculty and students.”). 
7 The nineteenth century’s most important American jurists—Story, Kent and 
Field—were intimately familiar with the Civil Law and advocated its study. See, 
e.g., Joseph Story: “There is no country on earth which has more to gain than 
ours by the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence. … Let us not vainly imag-
ine that we have unlocked and exhausted all the stores of juridical wisdom and 
policy.” Progress of Jurisprudence, Address Delivered Before the Suffolk Bar at 
their Anniversary September 4, 1821, at Boston, reprinted in The Miscellaneous 
Writings of Joseph Story 198, 235 (1852). See also James Kent, An Introductory Lec-
ture to a Course of Law Lectures 15 (1794) reprinted in 2 American Political Writing 
During the Founding Era 1760-1805, at 936, 945 (1983); David Dudley Field, De-
mocratic Review, April 1844, reprinted in 1 Speeches, Arguments and Miscellaneous 
Papers 491 (1884). For the influence of civil law ideas on 19th century American 
law, see, inter alia, Mathias Reimann (ed.), The Reception of Continental Ideas in the 
Common Law World 1820-1920, 89, 91 (1993); Stefan Riesenfeld et al., in 37 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 1-184 (1989) (special issue). 
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really little practical need for it.” Unfortunately, he laments that it 
“flounder[s] at a time when a shrinking world needs it more than 
ever.”8 The émigré generation retired decades ago and is reaching 
its twilight years. Even before its retirement comparative law be-
gan a decline in the United States. Whitmore Gray has pointed out 
that in the 1960s the money stopped, the interest stopped and the 
faculties turned to domestic problems.9  
 
2. Globalization and the Future of Comparative Law 
 
In its ignorance of comparative law, the United States stands close 
to alone among its principal trading partners. Because of global 
and regional forces—known now colloquially as “globalization”—
its trading partners are paying comparative law more and more 
mind. This is obvious in Europe, where the Single Market is be-
coming a reality through harmonized legislation attainable only 
after thorough comparative law studies. It is obvious in the 
emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, where for-
eign examples figure prominently in drafting new laws.  
 “Globalization” is a defining concept of our time. Global-
ization is a recognition that the societies of the earth are not sepa-
rate, hermetically-sealed units, but one. More than anything else, 
the collapse of communism and with it the artificial division of the 
world into competing camps has contributed to globalization. The 
development of the Internet and its improved possibilities for 
global communications will help speed these developments. For 
law, globalization may spell the reversal of that development of 
national codifications of the nineteenth century that meant the end 
of a common law of Europe and the development of national sci-
ences of law.10 Laws may increasingly become more global.  
 
                                                          
8 The Gradual Convergence: foreign ideas, foreign influences, and English law on the eve 
of the 21st Century 8 (1994). 
9 “Teaching the First Generation of Global Lawyers, Address to an AALS Mini-
Workshop January 1993,” reported in Newsletter of the American Foreign Law Asso-
ciation, Spring 1994, 5. 
10 Cf. Reinhard Zimmermann, “An Introduction to German Legal Culture,” in 
Werner F. Ebke and Matthew W. Finkin, Introduction to German Law, at 7 (1996). 
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 U.S. comparativists familiar with the East Bloc were quick 
to see the opportunity for comparative law created by the demise 
of communism. John N. Hazard and Wenceslas J. Wagner in their 
optimistic preface to the report of the U.S. contributions to the 
XIIIth Congress of the International Academy of Comparative 
Law observed already in 1990: 
 
 An era of democratization is dawning. Since 
the XIIth Congress of Comparative Law, held in 
Australia in 1986, much has happened. Fresh winds 
are blowing on every continent. … New models for 
government are being sought. Comparisons be-
tween legal systems are being made in the search 
for satisfying relationships between state and citi-
zen and between citizen and citizen. 
 Comparative lawyers with broad under-
standing of cultures, politics, and economics are in 
demand.11
 
Their insights have proven true—elsewhere—but not in the 
United States.  
To be sure, globalization has caught fire in the United 
States. Everyone talks of it, lawyers included. Law firms are now 
global law firms. U.S. firms compete with each other to open for-
eign offices. While reaching out for world business, the organized 
bar has reached out sincerely to assist the emerging democracies 
of the former Soviet Union through its “CEELI” (Central and 
Eastern European Law Initiative) program. The law schools have 
joined in the globalization. Scores of them have programs 
abroad.12 Law schools’ internal magazines proudly announce to 
their alumni how the law school is going global.13 One law school 
                                                          
11 38 Am. J. Comp. L., Supplement iii (1990).  
12 Brenden Kirby, “A National Geographic Summer,” National Jurist, January 
1996, lists more than 100 programs in some 39 countries.  
13 E.g., “Preparing International Leaders for the 21st Century,” Georgetown Law 
Res Ipsa Loquitur, Fall 1996;  “Cornell: An International Law School,” 23 Cornell 
Law Forum 3 (March 1997); “Europe 1992,” Wake Forest University School of Law 
Jurist, Spring/Summer 1991; “Connecting the World to the Classroom,” Washing-
ton University Law School Magazine, Spring 1993.  
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now even calls itself, “The First Global Law School.”14 Dozens of 
law schools maintain their own international law journals; some 
even have two! 
 There is, however, an element curiously lacking in the 
globalization of U.S. law: comparative law. U.S. law firms that 
open foreign law offices employ U.S. and foreign lawyers, but 
rarely encourage their U.S. lawyers to learn foreign law. The 
CEELI program, for all its commendable efforts, has something of 
a missionary-to-the-savages appearance in the little attention it 
seems to have given the indigenous legal cultures. U.S. common 
law institutions are not likely to take root in the republics of the 
former Soviet Union, whose legal systems are rooted in the civil 
law.15 U.S. law schools send their students abroad, gladly accept 
foreign students, but do not “globalize” their own faculties, which 
remain decidedly mono-cultural when it comes to knowledge of 
foreign legal systems.16 The numerous law school international 
law journals rarely include serious comparative law work.17 Law 
school programs that bring foreigners to the United States to teach 
them about the U.S. system and ignore foreign systems are remi-
niscent of the British imperialism nascent in the Rhodes’ Scholar-
ship Program. 17a  
 
3. Why Comparative Law Matters 
 
We lament that comparative law is unimportant in the United 
States when elsewhere it is of great importance. Some readers 
might disagree and assert that comparative law is of little impor-
tance. While we think that the importance of comparative law 
                                                          
14 “The First Global Law School,” NYU The Law School Magazine, Autumn 1994; 
“Special Issue 1995: The Global Law School Program,” NYU The Law School 
Magazine, 1995. 
15 See Ernst C. Stiefel, “Von der Berufung deutscher Juristen zum Aufbau des 
Rechts im Osten,” 1994 Juristenzeitung 109, 110.  
16 Whitmore Gray, supra note 9. 
17 See Eric Stein, “Uses, Misuses—and Nonuses of Comparative Law,” 72 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 198, 214 (1977). 
17a  The first sentence of the first book produced by the “Global Law School” is: 
“The importance of American Law in today’s world cannot be overstated.” Edi-
tor’s Preface, New York University School of Law, Fundamentals of American 
Law, v  (1996). 
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ought to be self-evident18—and it probably is to most contempo-
rary European lawyers—, we pause here to mention briefly three 
of the most obvious, most practical and most important uses for 
comparative law in the United States: 
 
• Foreign law is important for U.S. business. The United States 
does business around the world. In that business, it encounters 
other legal systems. U.S. business needs to know about the 
foreign laws it encounters. 
 
• Still more important is that U.S. law is not perfect. Even its 
most ardent advocates concede that. The United States could 
find in foreign legal solutions answers to problems it presently 
faces. The United States could adopt the foreign solution or, in 
the interest of world-wide harmonization of law, seek to reach 
a solution that works for all legal systems. 
 
• Perhaps most important is that comparative law provides 
critical perspective on U.S. law. Without the benefit of com-
parative law the United States cannot well measure it own 
law.19 
                                                          
18 Cf. P. John Kozyris, supra note 6 at 167 (1994) (“utility of the comparative 
method is beyond dispute”).  
19 Americans and Europeans alike have long recognized the value of perspective. 
For example, Calleb Cushing, who later became U.S. Attorney General, observed 
in 1820: “[I]t is by comparison of our rules and practice with those of foreigners, 
that we become fully sensible of what is defective or excellent, and therefore of 
what is to be cherished and upheld, or to be disapproved and abolished in our 
institutions. Nothing more inevitably checks improvement than a jealous or con-
temptuous rejection of foreign, and an over weening admiration of domestic 
habits, customs, and principles.” “The Study of the Civil Law,” 11 North Ameri-
can Review 407, 408 (1820). Gustav Radbruch, in simple strong words in 1946 in 
the wake of the Hitler catastrophe, wrote: “What in the law is fleeting and what 
eternal becomes most vividly clear through comparison..” “Erneuerung des 
Rechts,” in 3 Arthur Kaufmann, Gustav Radbruch Gesamtausgabe 80 (1990) 
(emphasis in original). To the same effect, see also Rudolf Schlesinger, Book Re-
view, 37 Cornell L.Q. 120, 124 (1951); Young B. Smith, Dean of Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law School, quoted in Francis Deak, “The Place of Foreign and 
Comparative Law in the American L. Rev.s,” 23 Va. L. Rev. 22 (1936); Pierre LeP-
aule, “The Function of Comparative Law,” 35 Harv. L. Rev. 838, 858 (1922), re-
printed in Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Rechtsvergleichung 63, 
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Only the most short-sighted of lawyers would allow comparative 
law to flounder and die in the United States. Instead, every right-
thinking lawyer should endorse the comparative study of law.20  
 
 
II. Reasons why U.S. Lawyers are not Learning from  
Comparative Law 
 
An understanding of reasons why U.S. lawyers are not learning 
from comparative law is helpful in considering the obstacles to 
changing that condition. In this contribution we suggest some 
possible reasons. Our enumeration is neither comprehensive nor 
empirically grounded. The reasons we discuss fall into four broad 
classes: 
 
• lack of necessary skills;  
• lack of institutional support for systematic comparative law 
work;  
• legal structures that resist comparative law influences; and,  
• an attitude that there is little to learn from foreign law. 
 
 
1. Lack of Skills and Skilled Persons 
 
a. Lack of Foreign Language Skills 
 
Lack of foreign language skills is an apparently simple matter, but 
one of enormous importance for comparative law in the United 
                                                                                                                                  
82 (1977). See generally for many current statements along the same lines from 
around the world, Peter Gilles, Prozeßrechtsvergleichung 105-12 (III.4: “Ziele und 
Zwecke, Leistungen und Nutzeffekte der Prozeßrechtsvergleichung”) (1996). 
20 Comparative law in the sense in which we are advocating it here requires stud-
ies that cross the common law—civil law divide, if not the Western, non-Western 
line. True comparative studies should not be limited to purely Common Law 
jurisdictions. Thus a comparison of rules of descent in U.S., English and French 
law would satisfy us, while the same comparison limited to U.S. and English 
rules would not.  
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States. Most U.S. lawyers—indeed most educated Americans—are 
monolingual.21  
 Max Rheinstein called attention to the importance of profi-
ciency in foreign languages for comparative study of law. He felt 
that every English-speaking comparativist should have thorough 
knowledge of at least French or German and preferably both, in 
addition, possibly, to other languages.22 The need of a comparativ-
ist for foreign languages is obvious: a jurist limited to English is 
limited to secondary sources if he or she wishes to read about the 
civil law. Detlev Vagts put the handicap succinctly: ignorance of 
foreign languages limits the lawyer’s ability to “penetrate foreign 
legal systems.”23
 It is understandable that most Americans do not study for-
eign languages to the point of proficiency required for compara-
tive law work. America is a huge continent and there is little rea-
son at home to know foreign languages. Abroad, everyone—or so 
it sometimes seems—speaks English. In many cultures, even lim-
ited knowledge of a foreign language brings commercial rewards. 
Not so in the United States, where even proficiency is apt not to be 
rewarded at all. So, as a result, few Americans study foreign lan-
guages and fewer still study foreign languages to the level of pro-
ficiency required for comparative law. In fall 1995, fewer than one 
in ten of all Americans enrolled in post-secondary education—just 
about 1.1 million students total—was enrolled in a foreign lan-
                                                          
21 Compare John H. Langbein, supra note 6, at 547 (“A background factor of 
great importance is the weakness of foreign language knowledge even among 
the most able and highly educated of American lawyers.”).  
22 “Comparative Law—Its Functions, Methods and Usages,” 22 Ark. L. Rev. 417, 
424 (1968), reprinted in 1 Max Rheinstein—Gesammelte Schriften 251, 259 (1979). 
Rheinstein no doubt advocated French and German because those are the lan-
guages of the two sub-traditions generally regarded as leading the Civil Law 
world. See Ugo Mattei, “Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual leadership in 
Western Law,” 42 Am. J. Comp. L., 195, 200 (1994). 
23 “Editorial Comment, Are There No International Lawyers Anymore?,” 75 Am. 
J. Int’l L. 134, 135 (1981). See also Hessel E. Yntema, supra note 3, at 906-07 (1956) 
(“But for the study of law, a central part of human culture, no such modicum of 
linguistic preparation is expected—not even for appointment to a law faculty. … 
[T]he percentage of those who in this essential respect are qualified for compara-
tive legal research has become exiguous indeed in the United States .”). 
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guage course.24 Moreover, Americans studying foreign languages 
disproportionately concentrate on Spanish: the number of stu-
dents studying Spanish far exceeds the number studying French, 
German, Italian, Russian, Chinese and Japanese combined.25
 The lack of foreign language skills, however, has an even 
more detrimental effect on comparative law than simply depriv-
ing the country of scholars able to do comparative work. The lack 
of language skills marginalizes comparative law work.  
 Lack of knowledge of foreign languages reduces the audi-
ence for comparative law work. Someone with even limited fa-
miliarity with a foreign language is more likely to be open to read-
ing in his or her own language about a foreign system conducted 
in that language than is someone who has no familiarity with the 
language at all. With the text in the mother tongue at hand, the bi-
lingual reader may be emboldened to investigate some aspect of 
the foreign system on his or her own. It is hard to imagine the re-
cent “reception” of U.S. law in Europe26 were English not so 
widely known, or for that matter, the reception of Roman law in 
Europe had not Latin been widely known then. 
 More invidious than the lack of an audience is that lack of 
foreign language skills can lead those without foreign language 
knowledge to regard scholarship requiring that knowledge as pe-
ripheral and even to denigrate those who have that knowledge. 
Alan Watson pointed out this phenomenon: “the scholars do not 
have the tools for the job; hence the job can’t be worth doing.”27 
                                                          
24 William H. Honan, “Language Study Shifts Again: Chinese Is Up, Russian 
Down,” New York Times, October 9, 1996, B9 (reporting the results of a survey of 
the Modern Language Association of America). 
25 1995 approximate enrollments: Spanish 606,000, French 205,000, German 
96,000, Japanese 45,000, Italian 44,000, Chinese 26,000 and Russian 25,000. Id. 
26 Regarding the “reception” of American law in Europe, see Wolfgang Wiegand, 
“Die Rezeption amerikanischen Rechts,” Festgabe zum Schweizerischen Juristentag 
1988, Sonderband 124 of the Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 229 (1988); 
Wolfgang Wiegend, “The Reception of American Law in Europe,” 39 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 229 (1991) and Rolf Stürner, “Die Rezeption U.S.-amerikanischen Rechts 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Festschrift für Kurt Rebmann 839 (1989). 
27 Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, A Case Study in Conflict of Laws 96 (1992). 
Further: “ It is not that scholars in legal history are lazy: it is only that foreign 
languages and foreign law are not part of their basic training and seem periph-
eral.” Id. at 97. 
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Does this mean that comparative law is actually unwelcome? Will 
a law journal that does not have the foreign language power nec-
essary to conduct the compulsory cite check be as open as one was 
recently and admit that,28 or will it simply reject the submission? 
We recall receiving back a draft book review from one law journal 
stating that it had already published reviews of enough books in 
foreign languages.  
 
 
 b. Lack of Individuals Skilled in Comparative Law  
 
Closely related to the shortage of language skills is the resulting 
shortage of individuals sufficiently skilled to conduct comparative 
law research. This absence was recognized decades ago when the 
émigré generation of comparativists began to retire, but nothing 
was done.”29 Today, the shortage of qualified comparativists is 
more acute than ever. P. John Kozyris noted: 
 
High-level legal work cannot be done without 
comparative study, and America has a serious lack 
of human resources in this field. The great com-
parativists of the eighteenth century who shaped 
American law in its formative years, such as Story 
and Kent, are long gone. Moreover, the generation 
of expatriates from Hitler's Germany and Central 
Europe, such as Rheinstein, Ehrenzweig, Rabel, 
Schlesinger, Riesenfeld, and Stein, who enriched 
                                                          
28 For example, one review prefaced an article with the note “The author of this 
Article was able to translate German sources into English. Unfortunately, The 
Pace International L. Rev. is unable to verify these sources. Thus, we are relying 
on [the author’s] translation, which we trust to be accurate.” See Thomas 
Swenson, “The German ‘Plea Bargaining’ Debate,” 7 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 373 n.* 
(1995). 
29 See “The Present State of the Science of International Law in the United 
States—An Address by R.R. Baxter Delivered on 13 November 1976, during In-
ternational Law Weekend [New York City],” reprinted in Michael H. Cardozo, 
The Practical State of Teaching and research in International Law 1974, at 6 (1977). 
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the American legal scene, is fading away and suc-
cessors are hard to come by.30  
 
The reasons for this serious lack of human resources are fairly eas-
ily identified. Serious comparative law work requires, as Max 
Rheinstein emphasized, serious preparatory work. One does not 
learn one’s own legal system overnight; years are required. A 
similar attention to the project is necessary for a U.S. lawyer seek-
ing to learn how foreign lawyers think. Max Rheinstein was ex-
plicit: he thought two years of study of a foreign system the 
minimum.31 We agree. The first year is necessary to understand 
the system as system to be able to place the individual objects of 
study within that system. Thorough and systematic study of two 
legal systems is characteristic of the careers of the best compara-
tivists. 
 Unfortunately, few tenured law professors or partnered 
practitioners have the time to spend two years studying a foreign 
legal system. If there is a time in one’s career when this can be 
done, for most lawyers it is at the outset of their careers. At that 
time, however, there are many competing considerations: paying 
off student loans, attractive offers, etc.  
 The present reward system of U.S. law does not, however, 
encourage recent graduates to do this. Neither the U.S. academic 
world nor the U.S. practice world values foreign legal study in the 
slightest. (It is different abroad.)32 The international legal ex-
change between the United States and Germany, Mathias Re-
imann noted, has been largely a “one-way-street”.32a The aca-
demic world and, to a lesser extent the practice world, values one 
and only one kind of “post-graduate” project: the judicial clerk-
                                                          
30 Supra note 6, at 178 (1994). 
31 Supra note 22. 
32 Cf. John Engle in The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 17, 1995 (“It is not an 
exaggeration to say that nearly everywhere but in America foreign study is con-
sidered to be a vital element of higher education, worthy of intelligent scrutiny 
and public support.”). 
32a “Abschied von der Einbahnstraße,” Address given for the Thanksgiving 
Program of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Juristen-Vereinigung (DAJV), Nov. 23, 
1996, reported in Cordula Woeste, “Gedanken zum Ausbau der deutsch-
amerikanischen Studienbeziehungen,” 22 DAJV-Newsletter 20 (1997). 
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ship. However one values clerking with a trial or appellate judge 
for learning about the U.S. judicial process, one certainly has to 
regard it as of extremely limited value for learning about foreign 
legal systems. Yet, that is the principal alternative career devel-
opment path open and, with respect to an academic career, in-
creasingly essential.33  
 
 
2. Lack of Institutional Support for Comparative Law Study 
 
a. Comparative Law Institutes 
 
The shortage of skilled comparative law researchers might be 
quickly remedied were there sufficient institutional support for 
such work. Institutional support is essential for comparative law 
work just as it is for work in any other area of concentrated, sys-
tematic research. The ideal situs for such work might well be in-
dependent research institutes such as are found in other areas of 
scientific endeavor. Then one would not have to look to legal 
practitioners, who are paid by clients, or to law faculty who are 
paid for teaching, to conduct comparative law research. Ernst 
Rabel thought that Germany, by creating comparative law insti-
tutes, had “filled a gap that neither law schools nor law firms 
could close.”34 Such an institute can bring together jurists from 
many different legal traditions and produce scholarship that no 
single jurist could ever hope to accomplish alone. A half a century 
ago, Rabel called for creation of such a U.S. institute of compara-
tive law along the lines of the present Max Planck Institutes, i.e., 
an institute composed of 15 or more professional members inde-
                                                          
33 See Robert J. Borthwick and Jordan R. Schau, “Note: Gatekeepers Of The Pro-
fession: An Empirical Profile Of The Nation's Law Professors,” 25 U. Mich. J. 
Legal Reference 191, 212 (1991) (“… the percentage of professors teaching today 
who began teaching in the 1980s and who completed clerkships is more than 
twice the percentage of professors who clerked and who were hired in the 
1960s.” at 214 ).  
34 Ernst Rabel, “On Institutes for Comparative Law,” 47 Col. L. Rev. 227, 230 
(1947), reprinted in 3 Ernst Rabel—Gesammelte Aufsätze 235, 238 (1967).  
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pendent of any university.35 P. John Kozyris recently renewed 
Rabel’s call for a U.S. institute of comparative law:  
 
We have national endowments for the humanities, 
the arts, and the sciences, so why don't we have a 
National Endowment for Law and Justice? Under 
the auspices of this endowment, an American Insti-
tute of Comparative Law (Institute) could play an 
important role by injecting wisdom from abroad 
into our understanding of policy choices and policy 
implementation in the United States. In addition, 
the Institute could become the main source for in-
formation on foreign laws and experts, providing a 
service of increasing value to legal practitioners. 
The Institute is only a dream, so let us make it a 
dream worth having, which means that it would be 
adequately funded and able to attract the best and 
the brightest comparative law minds from home 
and abroad. In the alternative, these functions 
could be dispersed among two or three existing 
workshops of comparative law, such as the Eason-
Weinmann Center, provided that the public fund-
ing is adequate and long-term.36  
 
Continued funding is a major obstacle to such a comparative law 
institute in the United States and it is not likely that we will see 
such an institute in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
b. Comparative Law in U.S. Law Schools 
 
Since we do not expect Professor Kozyris’ dream to be fulfilled in 
the United States any time soon, we would like to believe that the 
best hope for comparative law study is to be found in the law 
schools. At first blush, the health of comparative law in U.S. law 
schools seems good. Membership in the institutional organization 
                                                          
35 Id.  
36 Supra note 6, at 178 (1994). 
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that sponsors the American Journal of Comparative Law is at an all 
time high. Dozens of law schools sponsor programs abroad; doz-
ens sponsor journals of international and comparative law. Yet, as 
John Langbein has pointed out, this masks a “Potemkin Village.” 
While many courses may appear in catalogues, “virtually no-
body—only a handful of students—actually takes these courses. 
The vast majority of U.S. law students graduate in complete igno-
rance of comparative law.”37 The pages of U.S. law reviews are 
practically devoid of the work of serious comparative law schol-
ars.38 The law school that has enthusiastically and systematically 
supported comparative law study is the exception.  
 The present precarious state of comparative law in U.S. 
law schools is probably a by-product of larger forces at work in 
U.S. law schools. For a long time, U.S. law schools have been torn 
between competing professional and academic missions. More 
recently, they have experienced turmoil as new forms of scholar-
ship have challenged past ways of doing things. 
 Richard Stith has observed the “extraordinary educational 
distance between the two sides of the Atlantic” in legal educa-
tion.39 Where the civil law professoriate is “deeply imbued with 
an academic ethos,” the U.S. law school world is “strikingly dif-
ferent[:] … legal study is often called ‘professional’ rather than 
strictly ‘academic’.”40 Unlike Europe, where law was always a 
central part of the university, legal education in America grew up 
as a substitute for apprenticeship training with lawyers. Initially, 
                                                          
37 Supra note 6, at 546 (1995). Accord, M. Reimann, supra note 6, at 52. Reimann 
proposes to change matters by eliminating the “basic course” in comparative law 
and substitute “decentralized” teaching of comparative law in substantive law 
courses generally. While we appreciate Professor Reimann’s efforts and have 
nothing against introducing comparative elements in courses generally, we do 
not agree that the Basic Course should be jetisoned. We also believe that the is-
sue of use and non-use of comparative law, even limited to consideration within 
the academy, extends well beyond the calculus of how many students register 
for courses denominated “comparative law.”  
38 One exception is The American Journal of Comparative Law, which is a consistent 
source of high quality comparative law work However, many—perhaps most—
of the works it publishes come from abroad. 
39 “Can Practice Do Without Theory? Differing Answers in Western Legal 
Education,” 80 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 426, 429 (1994). 
40 Id. at 427. 
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law schools to be attractive to their clientele had to provide their 
students with a better form of legal training than could be had in 
the old apprenticeship system. They were so successful in their 
development, however, that they completely drove apprentice 
training from the field.41 Today, only university education is re-
quired for bar admission; there is no practical training required. 
Accordingly, U.S. law schools often respond first to their students 
need for training and only second to the needs of legal scholar-
ship. As Michael G. Martinek observed, they provide “Training 
instead of education.”42  
 Comparative legal research has long been a victim of the 
“box office”. Since students do not demand comparative law 
courses, law schools are not quick to provide them. But since law 
schools staff their faculties to teach particular classes and not to 
support broader research missions, they have not demanded 
comparative law scholars. 
 Within the framework of the professional school, more-
over, law schools can easily satisfy the limited demand that does 
exist for comparative law courses. One comparativist at a leading 
school wrote us that law schools see no need to add faculty mem-
bers in the comparative law field, since established faculty “with 
virtually no foreign law, language, or cultural background” can 
become “instant experts”—at least sufficient for course-teaching 
purposes—based on a short week’s visit abroad. Specialized 
knowledge is not necessary if all that is required is to offer enough 
to permit a law school to say, “check, done that.”  
 The instant expert would not be satisfactory if scholarship 
were a decisive criterion in selection of law faculty, but it is not.43 
Unlike in most of the American university, there is no require-
ment in law schools that professors have completed a doctorate 
                                                          
41 On the history of American law schools, see generally William P. LaPiana, 
Logic & Experience, The Origin of Modern American Legal Education (1994); Robert 
Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s (1983). 
See also, Craig Evan Klafter, “The Influence of Vocational Law Schools on the 
Origins of American Legal Thought, 1779-1829,” 37 Am J. Legal Hist. 307 (1993). 
42 “Der Rechtskulturschock: Anpassungsschwierigkeiten deutscher Studenten in 
amerikanischen Law Schools,” 1984 Juristische Schulung 92, 93.  
43 See James Gordley, “Mere Brilliance: The Recruitment of Law Professors in the 
United States,” 41 Am. J. Comp. L. 367 (1993). 
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and have established themselves as scholars. Richard A. Posner 
observed that “The essence of most graduate education is not the 
courses and the exams, but the preparation for a career in scholar-
ship that is afforded by the experience of writing a dissertation. 
Few law professors, even when they are practitioners of the new 
scholarship, have that experience.”44 Law professors possess, ac-
cording to Richard Stith, “not knowledge but intelligence;”45 ac-
cording to James Gordley they are selected for “mere brilliance.”46
 In Europe, as Richard Stith has observed, law is an aca-
demic field of study where students aspire to scientific under-
standing.47 The mission of a European law faculty would seem 
fairly clear. According to Horst Ehmann: 
 
The mission of the law faculties is the safeguarding, 
improving and further development of the law as 
well as the education of future lawyers with the 
ideal view of our time in the hope that the students 
of these faculties will be able to realize in their pro-
fessional lives a little bit of the ideal conceptions of 
which we can only dream. 48
 
The goals that we have identified above for comparative law—
knowledge of the laws of one’s trading partners, models for law 
reform and perspective on one’s own legal system—all fit quite 
easily within that mission.  
                                                          
44 Overcoming Law 101 (1995). The usual requirement is only a J.D., or Juris Doc-
tor, which while styled a doctorate, is not in any conventional sense. All 175 U.S. 
law schools combined bestow only a handful of true doctorates in law, the S.J.D., 
each year—less than twenty, typically. Richard Stith, supra note 39 at 428. See 
also Robert J. Borthwick and Jordan R. Schau, “Note: Gatekeepers Of The Profes-
sion: An Empirical Profile Of The Nation's Law Professors,” 25 U. Mich J. Legal 
Reference 191, 212 (1991) (noting the sharp decline in the last generation of new 
law professors with advanced degrees in law). 
45 Supra note 39, at 428. 
46 Supra note 43. 
47 Supra note 39, at 427. 
48 “Die Aufgabe der Zivilrechtslehrer,” in Juristische Fakultät der Universität 
Trier (ed.), Die Aufgabe der Juristenfakultäten, Festgabe für Otto Theisen, 11, at 34 
(1996).  
 
18 Ernst C. Stiefel and James R. Maxeiner 
 The world of the U.S. law school is quite different. Even 
though the last generation has seen a departure from the profes-
sional orientation of U.S. law schools toward what Richard Posner 
terms the “new scholarship,” it remains a world quite different 
from the European law faculty. It is a world beset by turmoil.49 
Beginning with the so-called Legal Realists, U.S. law schools have 
whole-heartedly endorsed social science work and have promoted 
interdisciplinary studies such as are typical of the law and eco-
nomics, critical legal studies, feminist law and critical race theory 
schools.50 Critics such as Richard Stith have observed that “if the 
Realists have largely failed to bring serious social theory into U.S. 
law schools, they have succeeded in driving out most serious legal 
theory.”51 Few today would deny the decline in the more tradi-
tional forms of legal scholarship that focus on doctrine. Richard A. 
Posner observed that “[d]octrinal scholarship has been in relative 
decline for many years, having been abandoned by many law pro-
fessors, especially young ones and especially at elite law 
schools.”52 According to Alan Watson: 
 
To an extent unparalleled elsewhere, students are 
not exposed to systematic treatment of law, with 
clear-cut concepts, institutions, and rules, but are 
presented with individual cases, outside of a his-
                                                          
49 See generally Richard A. Posner, supra note 44, chapter 2 (“The Triumphs and 
Travails of Legal Scholarship”) (1995); Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Law-
yers, part III (“The Lamp of Learning”) (1994). 
50 Critical Legal Studies in particular creates something approaching consterna-
tion for some foreign observers. Alexander Somek, Professor at the University of 
Vienna, notes that “most of the cls trademarks, such as ‘trashing’ or ‘deconstruc-
tion’ would appear to German scholars to be something threatening, dangerous, 
or indeed, nihilistic.” “Lecture: From Kennedy to Balkin: Introducing Critical 
Legal Studies from a Continental Perspective,” 42 Kan. L. Rev. 759, 764-65 (1994). 
See also Gerard Quinn, “Legal Theory and the Casebook Method of Instruction 
in the United States,” in Micheál Ó Súilleabháin (ed.), Legal Theory and Cases: 
Shifting Frontiers 9 (1994).  
51 Supra note 39, at 434. 
52 Supra note 44, at 84. Posner notes that Judge Harry T. Edwards has spoken 
eloquently of “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession,” 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992), which has led to a decline in “practical” 
scholarship. Judge Edwards’ article was the subject of a symposium issue of the 
Michigan L. Rev., August 1993. See 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921 (1993).  
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torical, doctrinal, legal context but against a back-
ground of social interests. Since this is the culture 
of U.S. scholars involved with law, and since it is 
hard to see the culture one lives, they take for 
granted that this is the way law does develop eve-
rywhere and at all times. They greatly underesti-
mate the role of doctrine and of a purely legal cul-
ture.53
 
There is little place in that world for comparative law.  
 Comparative law scholarship, which was probably the first 
field of legal scholarship to recognize the importance of historical, 
political and cultural factors, now seems quaintly old-fashioned to 
some adherents of the new scholarship because of its heavy reli-
ance on legal science and doctrine. Historical conceptions of com-
parative law—both in the United States and abroad—view law as 
a “science”.54 This is science not in the limited sense “science” is 
most frequently used in the United States, namely of an empirical 
science along the lines of physics or chemistry, but science in the 
broader European sense of an organized body of knowledge, such 
as in the German sense of Rechtswissenschaft.55 Eduoard Lambert, 
one of the French leaders of comparative law, spoke of the “sci-
ence of comparative law.”56 As recently as 1976 Richard R. Baxter, 
                                                          
53 Supra note 27, at 118 n. 29. But see Ugo Mattei, “Why the Wind Changed: Intel-
lectual Leadership in Western Law,” 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 195 (1994) (noting Ameri-
can intellectual leadership in law promoted, in part, by its the distance of Ameri-
can legal scholarship from authoritative texts). 
54 See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, supra note 3, at 903 (“comparative law is another 
name for legal science”). 
55 See generally David S. Clark, “Tracing the Roots of American Legal Educa-
tion—A Nineteenth Century German Connection,” 51 Rabels Zeitschrift 313 
(1987). This was the view held in early nineteenth century America as well. See, 
e.g., Daniel Mayes, “Whether Law is a Science,” 9 Am. Jurist 349 (1833). 
56 “Conception génerale et définition de la science du droit comparé, sa méthode, 
son histoire; le droit comparé et l’enseignement du droit” (1905), reprinted in 
Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken, Rechtsvergleichung 30 (1977).Cf. 
Edouard Lambert, “Comparative Law,” 4 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 126, 
129 (1931) (“comparative jurisprudence and law as a social science are two as-
pects of the same thing”); M. Schmitthoff, “The Science of Comparative Law,” 7 
Cambridge L.J. 94 (1941). 
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late U.S. Justice on the International Court of Justice, was not em-
barrassed to speak of “The Present State of the Science of Interna-
tional Law”.57 Today, however, we are informed that “the typical 
law faculty person would only laugh” at the idea of a science of 
law.58 According to Richard Stith, U.S. law students “never even 
hear that word.”59
 An important part of the science of comparative law—
though by no means the only part—is the careful exposition of 
foreign doctrine or, black letter law, if you will.60 But today that 
part is under direct attack. William Ewald published a book-
length critique of contemporary comparative law that in large 
measure is addressed toward what he sees to be comparative 
law’s weakness: too much attention to doctrinal matters.61  
 John Langbein has directly connected disdain for doctrine 
to the sad state of comparative law: “Th[e] instinctive disdain for 
other legal cultures derives in part form the intellectual movement 
known as legal realism, a movement that has, since the 1930s, 
strongly devalued the doctrinal integrity of American law.”62 
Lawyers and academics that are skeptical of doctrine are not likely 
to have much interest in comparative law with its implicit 
searches for the common core concept or the “better” solution. If 
                                                          
57 “The Present State of the Science of International Law in the United States—An 
Address by R.R. Baxter Delivered on 13 November, 1976,” supra note 29. 
58 This was a remark in 1996 of a retired comparativist at a leading law school. 
See also, Paul D. Carrington, “Legal Education for the People: Populism and 
Civic Virtue,” 43 Kansas L. Rev. 1, 36 (1994) (to the effect that medicine is a sci-
ence, while law finds its role in politics). For Europe, see, e.g., Konrad Zweigert 
& Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 45 (2d revised ed. 1992) (“What 
we must aim for is a truly international comparative law which could form the 
basis for a universal legal science.”) 
59 Supra note 39. 
60 Joachim Zekoll, “Kant and Comparative Law: Some Reflections on a Reform 
Effort,” 70 Tulane L. Rev. 2719, 2725 (1996) ( “Those who engage in comparative 
legal studies traditionally pay close attention to the text of foreign and domestic 
law. This should not come as a surprise, for the attempt to explore a normative 
system requires an exposition of its components, and the descriptive element 
inherent in this task is of basic importance.”).  
61 William Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a 
Rat?”, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, 1896 (1995). For a pointed response, see Joachim 
Zekoll, supra note 60. 
62 Supra note 6 at 551.  
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law is politics, well, why bother studying foreign examples? As 
usual, Langbein made his point with punch: “If you have been 
trained to view legal doctrine as a pack of feeble or even dishonest 
excuses, excuses masking the real interests and forces that under-
lie and explain the work of the courts, you will not have much re-
gard for the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch and for the style of legal rea-
soning that it embodies and fosters.”63
 
 
3. U.S. Legal Structures Resist Comparative Law Influences 
 
a. U.S. Law-making Methods Leave Little Room for Comparative Law 
 
Although the United States may have entered an “era of stat-
utes”,64 U.S. law-making is still dominated by common law think-
ing. Common law thinking and law creation are not be receptive 
to comparative law, whether the law making takes place in the 
context of judicial decision or legislation. 
 Insofar as judges make law, there is relatively little room 
for comparative law. Case law deals with authoritative points and 
does not seek to create a rational system; it is not abstract. In liti-
gation, the initial search is for binding precedent: the decision of 
the court superior to the one determining the case. If that can be 
found, no law-making is necessary. Obviously, a superior court’s 
decision does not involve comparative law. If no superior court 
decision is found and judicial law making becomes necessary, the 
law making involved is interstitial, that is, the judge is only filling 
in the “gaps.”65 Again, there is no obvious role for comparative 
law. 
 Even when the United States turns to legislation, however, 
the form of its legislation is not generally conducive to compara-
tive studies. Its pragmatic approach to legislation means that it 
tends to legislate about like it decides cases: one particular point at 
                                                          
63 Id. Compare David Fraser, “The Day the Music Died: The Civil Law Tradition 
from a Critical Legal Studies Perspective,” 32 Loyola L. Rev. 861 (1987)”. 
64 Compare Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982). 
65 See James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust 
Law: A Comparative Study 30-31 (1986); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the 
Judicial Process 113-14 (1921). 
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a time. The United States prefers to minimize legislation and dis-
perse the authority for it. 
 When U.S. lawyers think of forward-looking legislation, 
they normally think of one of three forms of legislation: federal 
legislation, “Restatements of the Law,” and uniform state legisla-
tion. Restatements of the law, by their nature, offer the least room 
for comparative law example. A restatement is supposed to “re-
state” the law with only a gentle motion to reform of law; that 
does not allow room for major departures from prior practice.66 In 
most instances, the only room for comparative law might help to 
choose the “better” solution from several options, but that would 
only where the comparative example would fit right in. Unfortu-
nately, uniform state legislation does not offer substantially better 
opportunities for comparative work. Uniform legislation, to be 
effective, requires that most of fifty different state legislatures 
adopt the same law. That requirement is not conducive for sub-
stantial departures from existing law and practice; the political 
exigencies require an appeal to that which we already have. That 
leaves federal legislation. 
 Federal legislation, even if it did not have similar political 
problems of acceptability for adoption that uniform state legisla-
tion has, would still have the basic problem of common law skep-
ticism of legislation. It faces the strong U.S. preference for prag-
matic, particularistic solutions. The United States simply does not 
choose to legislate abstract systems, but prefers to solve very par-
ticular problems. A striking example of this is the U.S. approach to 
data protection. While the principal trading partners of the United 
States now all have so-called omnibus statutes that apply to per-
sonal information generally, the United States legislates such pro-
tection only on what is called a sectoral or industry-specific ba-
sis.67 Thus the United States has strong protections for personal 
                                                          
66 See Hessel E. Yntema, “The American Law Institute,” in Max Radin & A.M. 
Kidd (eds.), Legal Essays In Tribute to Orrin Kip McMurray 657, 660 (1935); see also 
James Gordley, “European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficul-
ties,” 81 Col. L. Rev. 140 (1981). 
67 See Paul Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law (1996); Joel R. Rei-
denberg, “Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Privacy 
Sector,” 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 499 (1995) (arguing that “U.S. standards derive from 
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information contained in consumer credit reports and for video 
tape rental records, but little protection for medical records.  
 
 
b. Comparative Law Invites Law Reform which Offends Vested Interests 
 
One of the virtues of comparative law is that it challenges one to 
think critically about one’s own legal system. That suggests law 
reform and a change in the status quo.68 Machiavelli observed the 
obstacles would-be reformers face: “It should be borne in mind 
that there is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of 
success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating 
changes in a state’s constitution. The innovator makes enemies of 
all those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm 
support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the 
new.”69
 In the case of the United States legal system the forces for 
the status quo are particularly strong and well-entrenched. One 
observer of the U.S. court system observed: “The central obstacle 
to change in the courts is not the resistance to reform, but is, more 
fundamentally, the lack of interest in even thinking about 
change.”70 There is “a systematic tendency to retain the status 
quo.”71 The forces behind the status quo have the advantage that a 
legal system is a highly technical structure. Laymen are not well-
situated to reform it; but they, who have the knowledge to reform 
it, have vested interests in not doing it.72 As one critic who noted 
how well lawyers are doing within the current system put it, they 
                                                                                                                                  
the influence of American political philosophy on legal rule making and a pref-
erence for dispersed sources of information standards”). 
68 See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, “Reflections of a Migrant Lawyer,” in M. Lutter, 
Ernst C. Stiefel & M.H. Hoeflich (eds.), Der Einfluß deutscher Emigranten auf die 
Rechtsentwicklung in den USA und in Deutschland, 487, at 490 (1993). 
69 The Prince, translated by G. Bull. 
70 Malcolm M. Feeley, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail: A Twentieth 
Century Fund Report 192 (1983). 
71 Raymond T. Nimmer, The Nature of System Change: Reform Impact in the Crimi-
nal Courts, 176-77 (American Bar Foundation, 1978) 
72 Supra note 70, at 196. 
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are going to protect “the goose that lays the golden egg.”73 Many 
U.S. lawyers have done so very well in that system, that there is 
talk of an opulent “litigation industry”74 and of a “Litigation 
Gravy Train.”75 According to Professor Mary Ann Glendon, the 
United States has become “A Nation Under Lawyers.”76 The hand 
of the vested interests is further strengthened by what John Lang-
bein has called the “interconnectedness” of the system, that is, 
that all the parts work together as a whole. There really is no such 
thing as a “small reform.”77 Hessel E. Yntema pointed out the ef-




c. The 18th Century U.S. Constitution Hinders Certain System Changes 
 
Opponents of law reform often appeal to the 18th century U.S. 
Constitution to frustrate change. Wherever the Constitution con-
trols, change is especially difficult, since amendments to the Con-
stitution are so difficult to produce: they require two thirds ma-
jorities in both houses of Congress, consent of the President and 
approval by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. Rudolf 
B. Schlesinger noted how the U.S. Constitution contains a number 
of “positive provisions which, based as they are on common-law 
concepts, constitutionalize and thus perpetuate ancient and in 
part archaic rules and institutions.”79 Schlesinger identified the 
civil jury as a serious instance of such “antiquarian constitutional 
rules” impeding law reform.80 The jury as thus perpetuated consti-
tutionally has not been limited to the basic concept of lay partici-
pation in legal decision-making, but has extended to specifics of 
                                                          
73 Robert V. Wills, Lawyers Are Killing America, A Trial Lawyer’s Appeal for Genuine 
Tort Reform 8 (1990). 
74 Walter K. Olson, The Litigation Explosion 11, 46, 300 (1992). 
75 Editorial, “Ending the Litigation Gravy Train,” New York Times, January 21, 
1997, at A22. 
76 Supra note 49. 
77 Supra note 6, at 551-52.  
78 Supra note 3, at 900. 
79 Supra note 68, at 490. 
80 Id. 
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just what a jury must look like, namely, a panel of purely lay per-
sons, who decide as they wish without providing any legal justifi-
cation (Begründung), who must be protected from hearsay evi-
dence, whose decision should not be subject to review, etc.81 In 
other areas, the United States Supreme Court through interpreta-
tion of constitutional provisions, has constitutionalized large areas 
of the law, most notably, the law of criminal procedure, thus cre-
ating, as Schlesinger observed, “a giant obstacle to legislative re-
form.”82
 
4. An Attitude that Foreign Law has Little to Teach: Willful Blindness  
 
Willful blindness is our last reason for U.S. indifference to foreign 
law. Amazing as it may seem, many U.S. lawyers simply do not 
want to hear about foreign legal ideas. They are convinced—
without examination of competing choices—that their law is bet-
ter. It is nothing other than the “not invented here” idea. Rudolf B. 
Schlesinger observed this phenomenon: 
 
[W]hen it comes to problems of criminal procedure, 
[U.S. lawyers and Americans generally] are pos-
sessed by a feeling of superiority that seems to 
grow in direct proportion to the ever-increasing 
weight of the accumulating evidence demonstrat-
ing the total failure of our system of criminal jus-
tice. In large part, this feeling of superiority is 
caused by plain ignorance concerning the details 
and even the basic nature of the leading foreign 
systems. … This belief, which generates an attitude 
of unthinking contempt toward foreign systems, is 
200 years our of date.83
 
                                                          
81 See John H. Langbein, “Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental 
Alternative Fill the American Need?”, American Bar Foundation Journal (1981).  
82 Supra note 68, at 491 (1993). To the same end, Charles Maechling, “Borrowing 
From Europe’s Civil Law Tradition”, ABA Journal, January 1991, at 59. 
83 “Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience,” 
26 Buffalo L. Rev. 361, 363 (1976). 
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 The U.S. legal system enjoys the imprimatur of more than 
two centuries of constitutional and democratic development. In 
the last century, when the governments of civil law countries were 
still debating the merits of popular participation in government, 
the United States already had a democratic system. In this cen-
tury, when America responded to a world-wide depression by 
democratic means, civil law Europe fell under totalitarian control. 
The legal system enjoys the fruits of the successes of the political 
system. A lay observer, Anne Strick, noted that “Among patriotic 
fictions rooted marrow-dear is that which equates America’s legal 
system with truth and justice.”84 What would the United States, 
which has three times in this “American century” saved the world 
from tyranny,85 have to learn from these unreliable civil law sys-
tems? John Langbein has called this phenomenon the “Cult of the 
Common Law”: 
 
 The Cult of the Common Law is centered in 
that fusion of public and private law that seems so 
peculiar to persons trained in European legal sys-
tems. My suggestion is that the successes of Anglo-
U.S. public law have given an aura to our courts 
and our legal system that protects the system 
whenever criticism is directed toward serious 
shortcomings in the procedures and institutions 
that handle routine matters of private law and 
criminal law. Implicit in the Cult of the Common 
Law is the contention that the legal system is an in-
divisible package … and that any tampering with 
this complex structure risks the political liberties 
that have been historically associated with the An-
glo-American legal systems. Expressed in this way, 
the Cult of the Common Law is profoundly chau-
vinistic and reactionary. It seizes upon the rela-
tively precocious development of constitutionalism 
                                                          
84 Injustice for All: How Our Adversary System of Law Victimizes Us and Subverts 
Justice 15 (1977). 
85 Inaugural address of William Jefferson Clinton, January 20, 1997, New York 
Times, January 21, 1997, at A14. 
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in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and uses 
that as a shield against criticism based on foreign 
example. Again and again in discussions about the 
shortcomings of the contemporary legal system I 
find that when I draw upon foreign example, that I 
am met with responses such as, “Before you go on 
telling me any more about the virtues of German 
civil procedure, please explain why they had Hitler 
and we did not.”86
 
Patrick M. McFadden has identified a similar phenomenon con-
nected with the reaction of U.S. courts to international law which 
he calls “Provincialism in United States Courts.”87  
 The Cult of the Common Law is pervasive if rarely so 
crassly expressed as to deprecate foreign law. It is present at the 
highest levels of the bar. For example, the President of the Ameri-
can Bar Association in the December 1996 issue of ABA Journal, 
after acknowledging problems with the civil justice system, never-
theless wrote: “For all its faults, the American system of justice 
continues to be the envy of the world. It’s not perfect, but it works 
better than virtually any other system on Earth.”88 It is clearly pre-
sent wherever Americans see in their system a reference point for 
other legal systems as they develop their own legal regimes with-
out considering whether other legal systems might serve as refer-
ence points for the American. Moreover, the Cult of the Common 
Law is neither new nor limited to less intellectual members of the 
                                                          
86 Supra note 6, at 554. See also John H. Langbein, “The Influence of the German 
Émigrés on American Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure,” 
in Marcus Lutter, Ernst C. Stiefel and Michael H. Hoeflich (eds.), Der Einfluß 
Emigranten auf die Rechtsentwicklung in den USA und in Deutschland 321, 329 
(1993). 
87 “Provincialism in United States Courts,” 81 Cornell L. Rev. 4, 5 (1995) (“Over 
the past 200 years, United States judges have developed a series of rules and 
practices that minimize the role of international law in domestic litigation. Con-
sidered collectively, these rules and practices embody a thoroughgoing, deeply 
rooted provincialism—an institutional, almost reflexive, animosity toward the 
application of international law in U.S. courts.”). 
88 N. Lee Cooper, “President’s Message: All We Ask for Is Fairness,” ABA Journal, 
December 1996, at 6. Maxeiner’s letter in response is in the February 1997 issue at 
10. 
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bar. An American as profoundly aware of Continental legal ideas 
as Arthur L. Goodhart seems to have suffered from it.89  
 A result of the Cult of the Common Law is rejection of for-
eign legal ideas without even considering them. Over sixty years 
ago Karl Llewellyn counseled Stefan Riesenfeld that to identify a 
proposal as based on foreign law was to give it “the kiss of 
death.”90 With respect to the recent abortive reform of civil proce-
dure, the one “foreign” proposal seriously considered—the loser 
pays rule of England, and most other countries—was rejected 
with contempt, but without study. In the ABA’s section journal for 
lawyers one reads “The Truth about the “English Rule: “We 
should ‘stop, look, and listen’ to the facts about this so-called 
Loser Pays Rule before we simply assume that this idea, created in 
foreign legal jurisdictions, would beneficially apply to our own 
civil justice system.”91 In the realm of criminal procedure, the O.J. 
Simpson trial should have shown to even the densest observer—
regardless whether one feels the defendant innocent or guilty—
that the U.S. system of criminal justice is in sore need of reform. 
Yet in the ABA Journal one reads that those who would jump to 
conclude that the United States might want to consider foreign 
solutions are clearly in the wrong.92 One is constantly told, that for 
                                                          
89 See Carola Vulpius, Gustav Radbruch in Oxford 59 (1995). Goodhart (an Ameri-
can at Oxford) apparently discouraged Radbruch from having his Rechtsphiloso-
phie translated into English and complained that German jurists always seemed 
to want to bring their science to England but did not want to make English juris-
prudence useful for Germans. Goodhart wrote: “It is because of the uncertainty 
of political life on the Continent that these questions have so profoundly affected 
legal thought in those countries, and not because, as is sometimes said, foreign-
ers are more capable of philosophical thought than are Englishmen.” “Law and 
the State, 47 Law Quarterly Review 118, 121 (1931). 
90 Stefan Riesenfeld, “The Impact of German Legal Ideas and Institutions on Le-
gal Thought and Institutions in the United States,” in Mathias Reimann (ed.), The 
Reception of Continental Ideas in the Common Law World 1820-1920, 89, 91 (1993). 
91 G. Marc Whitehead & Robert B. MacDonald, “The Truth about the “English 
Rule”, 21 Litigation 3, 62-63 (1995).  
92 E.g., “In the end, viewers’ comments suggest that most people do not under-
stand the adversary system. … Indeed, many people seem to view the justice 
system as a pristine search for truth, where lawyers on both sides ought to serve 
as assistant truth-seekers. Many people’s comments appear to suggest that they 
would be more comfortable, at least in theory, with an inquisitorial [sic] system 
based on the European model. … If, however, the legal profession and the organ-
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III. Comparative Law in the U.S.A.—quo vadis? 
 
The reasons that we have discussed above suggest that there are 
very real obstacles to U.S. lawyers learning from comparative law. 
We regret to say that we are more pessimistic than optimistic with 
respect to whether these obstacles will be overcome anytime soon. 
Here is our view how the obstacles we have discussed are likely to 
play out in the next quarter century. 
 
• Americans will not suddenly start learning foreign languages 
in appreciable numbers. The best that we feel we can hope for 
is that enlightened U.S. law schools will prefer as students and 
faculty those rare individuals who are proficient in foreign 
languages. But Hessel E. Yntema called for that four decades 
ago and few law schools heard him.  
 
• U.S. law schools are not likely to find a place for comparative 
law, a step-child of all of three of the principal conflicting in-
terests that are battling for the soul of U.S. legal education. 
Comparative legal research is too doctrinal at a time when 
doctrine is out, but neither sufficiently practical nor suffi-
ciently theoretical for proponents of the principal alternatives 
to doctrine. Comparative law is on life-support at most U.S. 
law schools given their disinclination to bring in new com-
parativists. One comparativist at a major state university 
wrote us that “most of us are happy just to hold our own.” If 
no new blood comes in, time promises extinction. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
ized bar want the public to be truly informed rather than just inflamed about the 
issues in criminal procedure, the educational campaign needs to begin—the one 
that will demonstrate that the adversarial system, ugly as it often is to watch, is 
not a sausage factory, but the very basis of liberty.” Charles B. Rosenberg, “The 
Law After O.J.”, ABA Journal, June 1995. 
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• The U.S. legal system is not going to change its methods of 
law-making and substitute scientific legislation. Llewellyn’s 
Uniform Commercial Code was more likely an aberration than 
a harbinger of the future. While the United STates may turn 
more to legislation, it is not likely to build that legislation on 
foreign models or utilize studies of foreign law. The United 
States is likely to hold fast to its peculiar institution of proce-
dure: the adversary system. The entrenched special interests 
will not suddenly give up their power.  
 
• Americans may persist in a worldview formed in 1945 when 
the United States. stood almost alone unharmed by World 
War II. Fifty years later even educated Americans seem no less 
convinced of the righteousness of their legal and political sys-
tem and no more willing to accept the necessary idea of com-
parative law that foreigners might actually have something to 
teach. After all, the United States. is still the first choice of the 
world’s emigrants. It was the United States. that “beat” the 
U.S.S.R. in the Cold War. Such attitudes foster the continued 
vitality of John Langbein’s Cult of the Common Law. The best 
we hope for is that globalization will gradually change these 
attitudes. Until these attitudes are abandoned, we have no 
hope that U.S. lawyers will learn from comparative law. So 
long as they persist, U.S. law will suffer. U.S. law reform will 
be timid and inadequate. Americans will have only them-
selves to blame: U.S. lawyers’ ignorance of foreign law is no 
excuse. 
 
 
